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INTRODUCTION 
Eritrea is one of the least known guerilla warfronts in 
the world. It may not remain so because of the deep American 
interest in Ethiopia, which is centered upon the electronic base at 
Kagnew, in Ethiopia, and has an annual official U.S. budget of 
$12. 7 mill ion. 
It is fairly common knowledge that the heavy U.S. 
military aid to Ethiopia, which began in 1953, was fundamentally in 
return for the right to use the Kagnew base from that time until 1978. 
All this was in the atmosphere of Ethiopian support in the Korean war 
only two years before, when the Ethiopians sent more infantry than 
any other country in Africa. There is evidence that the dependence 
of the U.S. upon Kagnew may be drawing to a close before the Treaty 
ends in 1978. The "Symington Committee 11 of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee concluded in 1971 that "some of its earlier 
missions are now accomplished by satellites; others could be 
accomplished by facilities in other countries. 11 A likely candidate 
as a base is the British Island of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, 
where the U.S. and U.K. are moving to establish extensive facilities. 
In 1970 it was announced that $19 million would be spent there by 1973. 
The original U.S. intention was to help Ethiopia maintain 
internal order. Total aid to that poor country is now pushing towards 
$1 billion. More than one-half of all the U.S. military aid to Africa 
has been going to Ethiopia. This aid ranges from jets to M-14 rifles. 
In addition, Ethiopia also receives an Imperial Lion of Judah's share 
of economic aid. Projections for the next five years show a leveling 
off of U.S. aid- -at its high current level- -although more aid is to be 
given to Nigeria and Ghana, which, in the past, have trailed Ethiopia 
in receiving U.S. support. 
The U.S. did not contemplate that its military aid to 
Ethiopia would be used to suppress an active guerilla movement aimed 
at national liberation of a people. This sticky situation is compounded 
by the fact that a major presence of U.S. military equipment is con-
sidered to be the chief prop of the Ethiopian government against various 
attempted coups. Three U.S. -equipped battalions have been active in 
Eritrea. AU. S. major and two non-coms are at Kagnew as advisers. 
At the same time the U.S. Peace Corps mounted a major educational 
effort at both the primary and secondary school levels, the social 
impact of which is not yet fully measurable. 
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The political future of Ethiopia and of American interests 
at Kagnew are clouded by the knowledge that the incredible Haile 
Selassie cannot live forever. (Selassie' s visits to Kagnew normally 
include seeing the American dentist there.) Haile Selassie has done 
a remarkable job of statesmanship, mixed with political cunning and 
ruthlessness, in trying to modernize a feudal state without revolution. 
On my own visits to Ethiopia and through conversations with Haile 
Selassie and his sons, I have gained a great admiration for his acumen. 
Against seemingly impossible odds, the headquarters of the OAU were 
established in Addis Ababa. It is geographically isolated. Communica-
tions by land are almost impossible. It is landlocked except for Eritrea. 
It has a Christian minority ruling a Muslim majority, and it is almost 
surrounded by Muslim peoples. Furthermore, until the mid-1950s, the 
contempt the Ethiopians had for "black Africans" was so great, it was 
one reason Ethiopia refused to send students on a cooperative venture 
to the then-medical school for East Africa at Makerere College in 
Uganda. Finally, in an era during which the wave of African nationalism 
overtook most of colonial Africa, Ethiopia became an anachronism 
headed by his Imperial Highness! 
There is no question but that the U.S. has gained important 
military advantages from Kagnew--in communications, and various 
areas of code breaking and electronic warfare generally. The personal 
visit by Chief of Staff General Westmoreland in 1971 is an indication of 
its importance. However, there is evidence that Kagnew' s role in 
listening to Soviet stations has declined in value. Now the base is 
caught up in guerilla struggles, the defense of it and of the Ethiopian 
government is fraught with possibilities for unhealthy U.S. involvement. 
Already a U.S. courier has been murdered near Kagnew. 
Haile Selassie may have seen the handwriting on the wall. 
With undiminished shrewdness, he has moved to undercut the Eritrean 
Liberation Front, first, with military supporters of the ELF in Peking, 
and, second, with ELF's Sudanese friends who have provided the safe 
sanctuary so essential to most successful guerilla movements. 
In October, 1971, the Emperor visited China and conferred 
with Premier Chou En Lai and praised Mao Tse Tung for his ''outstanding 
achievements." During the six-day state visit, the first in 5, 000 years 
by a foreign Emperor, the Ethiopian leader signed trade pacts involving 
$80 million in interest-free loans to improve Ethiopia's commercial 
position. He praised the Chinese for being in a position to help the 
development of Third World countries. This visit was made, of course, 
before the American Presidential visit, and at a time when Peking was 
seeking African friends in her U.N. struggle for recognition vis-a-vis 
Taiwan. 
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The second move by the Emperor was his successful 
behind the scenes efforts, along with the World Council of Churches, 
to mediate between the rebellious southern Sudanese and the govern-
ment in Khartoum. The remarkable agreement which emerged in 
Addis Ababa in March, 1972, gives great promise of ending the 
sixteen-year long civil war and the devastation of the Christian and 
pagan south. This agreement guarantees no trials of rebels. It also 
provides for the inclusion of southerners in the governing body for 
the south, and the incorporation of guerilla units to form a southern 
Sudan defense force.':' 
If the Sudanese government carries out its bargain, it 
is likely that its relations with Ethiopia will continue to improve. This 
may spell trouble for the ELF training camps just across from the 
Ethiopian border. The various southern groups have called upon 
their followers to support the Addis agreement and to reassure the 
northerners that the autonomy they have attained within a united Sudan 
is not the prelude to a move for independence by the south. 
Both the pact with China and the Sudanese settlement have 
a value to Ethiopia in another dimension. They will discourage centri-
petal political movements. Haile Selassie has been faced with a whole 
series of regional uprisings, not just the one in Eritrea. There has 
been trouble in the Ogaden, Bule, Gojjam, and Tigre. The abortive 
coup of 1960, led by U.S. -trained Girname Neway, was a sign of dis-
content with the pace of modernization. The 1968 conspiracy by Galla 
officers--not U.S. -trained--was essentially regional in nature, rather 
than liberal. And periodically, the Emperor has felt compelled to close 
the University for what he felt were student threats to gradual modern-
ization. 
The amazing 79-year-old Emperor may not be at the end 
of his diplomatic involvements, if the local threats to Amharic rule are 
to be postponed, at least during his lifetime. He has accepted an invita-
tion to visit the Kingdom of Lesotho, and this would plunge him directly 
into the question of South Africa and its outward-bound policy of "dialogue. 11 
It is within such broader contexts that this is sue of the 
"Notes" 1s concerned with the Eritrean Liberation Front. 
~'See "Agreement Issue 11 of the Grass Curtain, Vol. 2, No. 3, 
May, 1972, featuring cover photographs of Sudanese President Nimeri and 
Major General Joseph Lagu of the Anya-Nya. 
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The author of this issue, Richard Lobban, is trained 
as an anthropologist. He took his B.S. at Bucknell, an M.A. at Temple 
University, and is currently completing his Ph. D. at Northwestern 
University. Since 1964 he has been active with various liberation 
movements, beginning with Frelimo in Tanzania. 
Mr. Lobban went into Eritrea with the ELF to attend 
the First National Congress of the Eritrean Liberation Front. He 
traveled hard and dangerously while observing the operations of the 
liberation army and the response of villagers to it. In such a role he 
styles himself as a 11 progres sive free -lance journalist. 11 In common 
with many writers on the New Left, he likes to draw parallels between 
revolutionary movements on the left throughout the whole developing 
world, and conversely sees the United States as a rather reactionary 
if not imperialistic force in these situations. 
The fact that Mr. Lobban was not actually able to attend 
the Congress he set out to attend, because it was postponed beyond his 
own time limits, does not invalidate his observations of the operation 
of the Eritrean guerilla movement. The details of the Congress, when 
it was subsequently held, were relayed to him by what he considers 
to be most reliable sources. 
E. S.M. 
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ERITREAN LIBERATION FRONT: A CLOSE- UP VIEW 
Richard Lobban 
In October and November of 19 71, the Eritrean Liberation 
Front held a political convention. My wife and I had been attending the 
trial of Rolf Steiner':' in Khartoum when we, along with -a number of 
other journalists, were kindly invited by the ELF to attend its first 
Conference deep inside liberated territory. For several reasons my 
wife declined to go, but I accepted. I went in the basic capacity of a 
free-lance, progressive journalist. 
The Convention was hardly like those which require hotel 
registrations and meeting room reservations. It took some time before 
the final trek began after several delays. I entered Eritrea with a 
Scandinavian radio-t.v. journalist, various representatives of the ELF, 
and about 100 soldiers. At the border between the Sudan and Eritrea, 
it was necessary to abandon normal transportation and to proceed on 
foot. After crossing the frontier, we moved with soldiers from the 
Eritrean Liberation Army. On the way other village representatives 
joined us, and we frequently met other detachments on route. 
We had walked for about a week when, deus ex machina, 
it was decided that the Congress was to be postponed. I gathered that 
this decision was made for security reasons, but I never knew the exact 
reason. I had already committed two weeks of really hard, hot, extremely 
thirsty, and very long marching. To attend the Conference would mean 
another month of waiting, plus a month at the Conference, and then 
another week or two of walking back out. My fellow Scandinavian 
journalist felt that he would have to leave, and, after some discussion, 
it became apparent that I would also. On the way out, I met two French 
and one Italian journalists and talked with them at great length, as well 
as with some Palestinians. These people all went on to attend the 
Conference. I arranged with them to meet afterwards, which we did 
in Khartoum. There we rehashed the Conference's major events, political 
directions, etc. In this way, although I was not able to attend the 
Conference myself, I received what I consider to be reliable first-hand 
':'The famous guerilla mercenary who fought in Biafra 
and in the southern Sudan. For an account of meeting Steiner inside 
the Sudan, see The Anya-Nya: Ten Months' Travel with its Forces 
inside the Southern Sudan by Allan Reed. Munger Africana Library 
Notes No. ll, February, 1972. [Ed.] 
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information from many of those who did attend. My walking experiences, 
if not the route, were virtually identical to theirs, and I gathered much 
information about the ELF, its army, and details of the Congress itself. 
What is this little-known war between Eritrea and Ethiopia 
all about? Isn't Ethiopia (one of Africa's poorest and most backward 
nations) a strongly unified state? Why should progressive people support 
this movement against an "independent" African country? 
The question concerning what constitutes nationalism has 
been central to some of the most heated and divisive debates in revo-
lutionary politics. It is generally agreed that a people must have a 
separate history, a separate territory, and a common language to truly 
qualify as a national entity. It happens that Eritrea meets these criteria, 
although there are several Eritrean linguistic stocks of which Tigr~ and 
Tigrina are perhaps the most significant. The majority of the ELA are 
Moslems (if they practice), while the dominant ruling Amharas of 
Ethiopia and of the Eritrean bourgeoisie (in the central mountain area), 
who maintain control over Ethiopia and Eritrea, are predominantly 
Christians. 
The E ritrean war is considered by some to be separatist 
or religious in nature. In my view, it is clear that this struggle is not 
separatist, but nationalist. Ethiopian expansion is the chief cause of 
the strife. Because Ethiopia is dominated by a Christian ruling class, 
the resulting assumption often is that its enemies must be anti-Christian. 
Such an assumption only clouds the reality of the situation. What the 
ELA feels it is opposing is the solidarity of Christian rulers and their 
repressive feudal state. It is worth noting that only one member of the 
Imperial Cabinet is Moslem and he is not from Eritrea. On the other 
hand, there are many Christian members of the ELF. Perhaps a 
superficial analysis might suggest that the war is Muslim vs Christian 
in nature, but a closer examination of the situation would indicate that 
it is more between oppressed and oppressor. 
The Ethiopian government consistently gives the percentage 
of Moslems in the province at 40%. Since the uncensused lowlands are 
solidly Moslem, and the central highlands have a very great admixture 
of Muslims and Christians, a percentage of Moslem at 70% is more 
accurate.>:< By stating that the Moslems are a lower percentage than 
they really are, the Ethiopians attempt to make the national liberation 
movement appear as an isolated action of a minority, when the opposite 
is the case. 
~<A student from Ethiopia agrees that the Ethiopian govern-
ment always quotes a low figure for Muslims, but most accepted percen-
tages are SO% Muslims and SO% Christians, with Muslims slightly in the 
majority. [Ed.] 
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Because the background of this war is not widely known, 
it is worthwhile to review some of the historical, political, and social 
factors underlying the conflict. Old Portuguese records reveal that 
there was always fighting between the kingdoms of Gondor and Lallibela 
in an age-old battle between the people of what is today Eritrea and the 
pulsating expansive drives of the Abys sinians. For hundreds of years 
this territory has been defended and attacked. The Tigre leader, Kasai, 
provided food and fodder for the British, who, on April 13, 1868, were 
led on a punitive mission by Field Marshall Lord Napier against Emperor 
Theodore, who represented Christian domination of the Tigre people, 
in the British assault at Magdala. During the 1880s the Italians colonized 
the coastal regions of Eritrea, and, by 1890, they had reached Asmara 
in the central highlands. The famous battle of Adowa in 1896 stopped 
further penetration by the Italians until their successful campaign of 
1935-36. As these examples illustrate, the animosity between the two 
regions has been of long duration, whereas colonial history has remained 
separate from the situation.>!< 
When Italy was defeated by the Allied Powers in 1941, the 
question of Eritrea• s future was left to the United Nations. It wasn 1t 
until February 12, 1950, that the UN finally approved a resolution to 
federate Eritrea with Ethiopia, but with Eritrea as an 11 autonomous 
unit, 11 recognizing its distinct character. This federation was effected 
by September 15, 1952, but only after many secret meetings between the 
Ethiopian and British and American administrators. 
>:<The same Ethiopian student agrees that there were regional 
animosities and struggles between the various Abyssinian emperors and 
their vassals in the Eritrean region. But he does not consider these 
struggles to be unique with Eritrea nor based on any feeling of 11Eritrean 
nationalism 11 or Pan Arabism at that time. He says: 11 The Eritrean struggle 
for independence, I believe, is more rooted in Eritrea 1 s special colonial 
and post-colonial history in the last 80 years or so, during which Eritrea 
developed along separate lines from Ethiopia. 11 
It is often forgotten that when Mussolini launched his attack 
on Ethiopia, primarily from Eritrea, the Italian forces contained local 
E ritrean units, many of which deserted to the Ethiopians. There were 
also Eritreans on the southern front, where Marshal Graziani was pushing 
north from Somalia. Here, too, much to Graziani's disgust, the Eritreans 
deserted to the Ethiopians and were mercilessly dealt with by the Italians 
when the fascists finally won. [Ed.] 
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Little by little the autonomy promised to Eritrea was 
eroded by the Ethiopian government. Opposition to this erosion was 
present in Eritrea in the early 1950s, but the political parties were not 
democratic and effective organization was lacking. By the late 1950 s 
the Eritrean masses began to show cohesion as the Eritrean Liberation 
Movement, which underwent much political growth before it emerged in 
1961 as the Eritrean Liberation Front. The details of this period have 
been recorded in many places, such as United Nations publications. 
Imperial authorities deemed it necessary to provide continuous police 
action between 1952 and 1962 in order to control restive Eritrea. By 
1962, Ethiopia had banned all political parties there, independent news-
papers were closed, the Eritrean flag was brought down, and Eritrea 1 s 
Constitution and Parliament were suspended. 
In 1961 the underground ELF organization had asked Hamad 
Idris Awate, a daring liberation fighter, to initiate armed resistence 
against the Ethiopians, as the only way they could see to possibly restore 
freedom and dignity to the Eritrean people. Emperor Haile Selassie 1 s 
response to this move was unilaterally to declare, without vote or dis-
cussion of any kind, complete annexation of Eritrea on November 14, 
1962, and abolishment of the UN resolution. Today, about three-fifths 
of Eritrea is considered to be liberated, which means that the enemy 
Ethiopian troops are not free to enter these areas, or if they do enter, 
they will be dealt with very severely and suffer heavy losses. Another 
fifth of the country constitutes the urban areas and military camps still 
under enemy control. The remaining portion is semi-liberated and, 
accordingly, the struggle is most intense in this region. 
Ethiopia is one of Africa 1 s poorest nations, with a $66 
income per capita. Africa itself is poor, but the average income is 
almost three times higher at $171 per capita per year. The literacy 
rate of 7% of the total population of Ethiopia suggests part of the reason 
for such overwhelming poverty. Addis Ababa, the showplace capital, 
is literally built on the backs of the poverty stricken. Anyone who 
visits this capital cannot help but be struck by the gulf between the rich 
and poor. About one-third of the national budget of only $208 million 
goes to security and defense to maintain the feudal grip of the Imperial 
classes. The period between 1964 and 1967 witnessed a 68.2% increase 
in these military expenses, as the war in Eritrea intensified, as well 
as hostilities between Ethiopia and Somalia. 
The Eritrean Liberation Front and its Liberation Army are 
organized on the lines of a guerilla military pattern. As such they seek 
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to inflict harm and embarrassment on the enemy while conserving their 
own strength. Attack when the enemy is resting and retreat when the 
enemy is attacking are basic principles. The ELA is very well armed, 
and, indeed, may be one of the best guerilla armies, militarily speaking, 
in Africa's multi-fronted wars of national liberation. This army is 
designed to be highly mobile and, depending on the terrain, can move 
more than sixty kilometers in one day if there is need. In the war so 
far the ELF has concentrated primarily on military targets and personnel 
in its military attacks. Symbols of the Imperial Government and its 
officials have also been targets for attack. 
One of the ELF's more significant military actions took 
place on November 7, 1966, when seventeen Eritrean towns were simul-
taneously attacked at midnight while an OAU summit conference was being 
held in Addis Ababa. This was de signed to focus world attention on the 
Eritrean struggle. Another action occurred on March 25, 1967, when 
a notorious official from the Ministry of the Interior was shot and killed. 
During a large-scale Ethiopian offensive, the ELA reported 793 Ethiopian 
soldiers killed, while their own losses were relatively slight. 
In March 1969 the ELF blew up an Ethiopian Airlines plane 
at Frankfurt, Germany. In June of the same year another plane was 
attacked in Frankfurt and one was damaged in Karachi. In September 
a plane was hijacked to Khartoum and one to Aden. In December another 
hijack attempt was foiled over southern Europe. These events brought 
world attention to Eritrea. On May 17 and 19, 1969, railway tracks and 
bridges were destroyed between Djibouti and Ethiopia; an explosion 
occurred at the Ethiopian Consulate in Djibouti and another bomb exploded 
at the Central Bank in Addis Ababa. 
These publicly observed incidents were all claimed by the 
ELF in their goal to disrupt the social and economic life of Ethiopia. 
In the period between January and May, 1971, more than fifty incidents 
were reported in seeking the ELF goal. Since 70% of Ethiopia 1 s foreign 
trade goes through Eritrea to reach the ports of Assab or Massawa, 
disruption of this sort is very costly in time and money for Ethiopia. 
A recent incident which received world-wide publication 
occurred near the central Eritrean city of Keren, which had earlier 
been occupied for eight hours in an ELA "mini-Tet11 offensive (in that 
it sought only political goals, and military conquest was not the main 
concern). The ELA ambushed a train at a station and politely asked 
the passengers, including many military men, to disembark. Meanwhile, 
down the tracks another team had unfastened the railroad track at a 
trestle spanning a gorge. The train resumed its forward motion with 
no passengers and tumbled car by car into the gorge in a mass of fire 
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and crumpled metal. Not a shot was fired nor a pound of dynamite used, 
but an entire, militarily important, train was completely destroyed. 
As the nature of the political struggle changed with a broader 
involvement of the masses, outside support also altered. Early in the 
war socialist countries were contributing much of the weaponry, either 
directly or through friendly countries. In June of 1965, eighteen tons of 
Czechoslovakian arms were seized in Khartoum. During this period and 
up until 1967, aid from Libya, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia was also known 
to be received. Some Egyptian weapons and advisors were reported. 
By 1971-72, little trace of these reactionary Arab states was to be seen. 
As such moderate and reactionary Arab countries drew back, Cuba and 
China began to show more interest in the movement. One reporter said 
in 1967 that the ELF "has no clearly defined ideological leanings ••. " 
This is no longer true today. Many officers have now returned from 
military and political training in Cuba, China, and those Arab countries 
which have reliably supported the Palestinian struggle to regain their 
lost homeland. The training is excellent and has produced "surprising 
discipline" among the soldiers as well as a "first rate intelligence net-
work"--two waiters at the Kagnew radio base in Asm.ara were recently 
arrested as ELF spies. Relations with the Sudan have been unpredictable, 
depending upon the current regime in Khartoum. At the present the ELF 
Khartoum office is closed down and arms must move clandestinely across 
the border or across the Red Sea. In this regard, South Yem.an is also 
important, as it lies just across from the Eritrean coastline and has a 
very militantly progressive political posture. Haile Selassie has 
recently made threats to deport all South Yem.enese from Ethiopia unless 
their horne government makes efforts to curb the smuggling. 
As with most guerilla armies, the ELF has obtained large 
amounts of its weapons from the enemy. Old British rifles are common. 
The big British Bren machine gun is quite popular, as it delivers heavy 
firepower and is relatively light. Some American weapons are also 
found, especially sidearms. The crack ELA assault forces, however, 
are using the Klashnikov from Russia and Czechoslovakia, and the 
Chinese Sim.onov. Friendly socialist and progressive countries have 
helped to make these contributions. Hand grenades and heavy anti-tapk 
weapons and other explosives are also part of the ELA armory. Each 
of the efficient soldiers is given nine months of military and political 
training inside liberated territory. It is incredible to watch 75 armed 
men just disappear into rocky terrain right before your eyes. Each 
footstep of a soldier demands a constant search for the next rock, tree, 
or dry river bed from which to make a defense. 
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The Ethiopian statistics about the strength of the ELF are 
not accurate. It is these statistics that western news sources rely upon. 
For a long time the Ethiopian governme:p.t figures indicated that only 
1, 000 soldiers were in the ELF. These figures have been regularly 
updated, and now Ethiopia acknowledges that there may be as many as 
3, 000. In 1969 the ELF estimated that ' it had 8, 000 under arms. Naturally, 
ALL of these figures are tentative, but they do illustrate the regular 
tendency of the Ethiopian authorities to underplay their enemy's strength. 
Frequently, the only knowledge of this movement is from 
the press service of Ethiopia, which, besides playing down their own 
losses, labels the ELA as "bandits. 11 Having walked for 500 kilometers 
and spent two weeks inside liberated territory, I can only conclude that 
this statement is just nonsense. First of all, the environment of Eritrea 
consists of flat dry plains, except at the Sudanese border and in the 
central mountainous zones. The East is virtually desert and is sparsely 
populated. To live in such areas requires both knowledge of the terrain 
and assistance from the local people. On our march I saw countless 
examples of the close relationship between the ELA and the people--
since their interests are the same. As an example, we traveled with 
some heavy equipment and material which needed camels for trans-
portation. Each village provided us with the camels which took us to 
the next village, where we wereprovided with fresh animals to continue 
onward. Each village also took care of drinking water and unending 
amounts of fresh sweet milk. If the ELA was interested in more sub-
stantial food, they could buy a goat or a sheep from any village or 
herdsman. Sometimes we slept in villages, although, for security 
reasons, we usually slept outside of the villages themselves. Villages 
also supply valuable and accurate intelligence of enemy movements, 
whether by ground or by air. Each village is organized with its own 
democratically elected representatives in the ELF. All legal matters 
are adjudicated by the ELF, whether concerning military questions or 
simple civil disputes. In my experience, the ELF and the villagers 
are distinguishable only by weapons and uniforms; each village welcomed 
us with unhesitating friendship. This is not what you would expect to 
find if the ELA soldiers were only 11bandits. 11 
Although constant vigilance is maintained, most of the 
areas through which we traveled were completely liberated. One day 
a force of more than 100 soldiers was gathered to make a mock assault 
to illustrate battlefield tactics. It was in the middle of the afternoon in 
full daylight when the guns--both the Bren and automatic fire--opened 
upon fictive targets. The control of the territory was so complete that 
there was no concern for whatever enemy might be within listening dis-
tance. 
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R. Lobban 
E.L.F. 
On a former occasion an ELA commander sent a note to 
an Ethiopian Army post to say that he would be visiting a village at a 
certain time and that he wanted no interference from the Ethiopian 
Army or the ELA would destroy the village. The Emperor's Army 
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was forced to comply with the ELA' s wishes, and the ELA then 
enjoyed a meal in town. 
The American trained and armed Ethiopian Army Second 
Division is in charge of the security and defense of Eritrea. Their 
brutal search and destroy missions have forced thousands out of the 
lowlands into neighboring Sudan, where they live a life of exile. 
Governor General Prince Asrate Kassa, who is a kinsman of the 
Emperor, and who once referred to the ELF as a 11 Mafia with 
Marxist cadres, 11 has been replaced by a military governor, Debebe 
Haile Mariam, who administers martial law since the declaration of 
the State of Emergency. The 10,000 soldiers of the Second Division 
are fighting the same battle with the 4, 500 police -commandos, who 
have been trained by the Israelis for counter-insurgency warfare. 
The Ethiopian Army in Eritrea is composed of peasant 
recruits who have been fed the idea that the ELF is destroying the 
country. While these peasant soldiers and local mercenaries fight 
bravely, they have no sense of tactics, and, during any armed attack, 
the Ethiopian Army takes immense losses, while the ELA and its 
mobile units escape relatively untouched. This is not to say that the 
civilians have been immune from the terrorizing attacks of the Ethiopian 
Army. Some of the larger, and more recent, My-Lai-like massacres 
have occurred at Bascadara on November 27, 1970, when ll2 people 
were herded into a mosque and shot down; at Keren on December 1, 
1970, when more than 600 civilians lost their lives from Ethiopian-
American napalm and ground action; and on January 27, 1971, when 
about sixty people were killed in a mosque at Elaberte. 
Israeli military training has been carried out at Decmare 
at the Eritrean military school headed by Colonel Ben Nathaw who has 
already trained more than 5, 000 soldiers. In addition, the Israelis 
train the Ethiopian Marine Commando Forces under Israeli Colonel 
Don. This force is extremely important in trying to stop the smuggling 
of arms across the Red Sea. Iskender Desta, the grandson of the 
Emperor, is formally in charge of the Red Sea blockade as the 
Commodore of the Navy. Desta's reputation as international playboy 
contributes to the ineffec:;tuality of the blockade. Israeli bases on 
strategic islands in the Red Sea and the activities in Eritrea and 
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Ethiopia are part of its deep interest in African and Arab affairs. An 
Israeli spy captured in Cairo early in 1972 testified that he had been 
sent to Eritrea to gather intelligence information on the state of the ELF. 
In August of 1967, the Israeli advisors stressed that the Arab 
world was in disarray following their embarrassing defeats in the Sinai 
and at the expanding borders of Israel. Consequently, the time to attack 
was ripe. American assault planes bombed and strafed the Western 
lowlands, an ELF stronghold, and initiated a "pacification program" 
including about 200 "fortified hamlets." The Second Division, under 
Brigadier General Merid Bayene, continued with a sporadic scorched 
earth campaign. Hamlets such as Garabeet, Ashur, Adfaki, Sanheet, 
Tukumbia, Sawa, and Falkat were practically eliminated. Attempts at 
arming villages against the ELF also failed when it appeared that most 
of the guns were getting into their hands. In desperation, General Mariam 
withdrew and decided to concentrate his forces on strategic areas and 
abandon those zones of little economic or military consequence. Thus, 
these battles were won by the ELF. 
Nevertheless, the press in Ethiopia said a year later that 
they "broke the back" of the ELF whose forces they estimated to be only 
1, 000 men. But how wrong they were. In frustration, bodies of slain 
ELF soldiers and civilian supporters were publicly hung in Eritrean 
cities as a warning to others. While this was denied by Ethiopian author-
ities, some photographs were smuggled out which brought the truth to 
those interested. 
As if to heap insult upon injury, the ELF carried out a 
daring daylight attack on the Keren-Asmara h .ighway, on November 21, 
1970, killing General Teshome Irgetu, the Commander of the Second 
Division Infantry. His death brought about a quick response and soon 
American planes were bombing Keren, Eritrea's th.ird largest city, with 
anti-personnel and napalm bombs; hundreds were killed. 
In the past few months Israel has suffered major setbacks 
in this area of Africa. The rebellion in the southern Sudan, with which 
it was deeply involved, has been ended with a compromise by the 
Khartoum and Addis Ababa governments. Both have agreed to curtail 
the movement of arms into each other's territory. In Uganda, too, the 
unpredictable Iddi Amin has turned on the Israelis and asked them to leave, 
even though it is strongly rumored that they were partly behind the coup 
d'tHat which brought him to power. 
. . . . . . . . . 
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The United States has been giving military aid to Ethiopia 
since 1953, just after the federation, which they helped to organize, 
was implemented. In 1960 a formal secret pact was made between 
the U.S. State Department and the Ethiopian Government in which the 
United States " ••. reaffirmed its continuing interest in the security of 
Ethiopia and its opposition to any activities threatening the territorial 
integrity of Ethiopia." There was no mention of what should happen 
if Ethiopia should threaten someone else 1 s territorial integrity, and 
two years later Eritrea was formally annexed by the Emperor. 
It was at this time that the United States agreed to support 
a 40, 000-man Imperial Army. In 1964 the United States military aid 
increased again with the shipment of a squadron of F- 5 fighter jets 
and a 55-man counter-insurgency team to deal with the "minor insur-
gency" in Eritrea. The U.S. Army's ''Strike Command" Commander 
also began his visits around this time. Currently, this Commander 
visits the Emperor at least once a year, and he "maintains a mobile 
force to move into danger spots" if need be. 
In the past few years, the United States has been giving 
close to $13 million per year to Ethiopia in military aid alone, which 
is greater than any amount given to any other African country. In 
addition, for economic aid and technical assistance, it gives another 
$20 million annually, one of the highest amounts given for this purpose 
to any of the African countries. 
The United States Military Assistance Advisory Group 
currently maintains about 150-200 officers and men for specialized 
training in Eritrea, and the Ethiopian Air Force is equipped with both jet 
fighter and fighter bombers especially suited to counter-insurgency 
warfare. Although it is denied by the State Department, the Green Beret 
Special Forces are also reported to be in service in Eritrea. The 
Ethiopian Navy based at Massawa in Eritrea consists of American-built 
ships. Massawa is also a center for off-shore oil explorations by Gulf 
Oil and a Mobil-Es so consortium. The Ralph Parsons Company's':' 
tax exempt mining rights and the more than 200 other American com-
panies in Ethiopia also figure importantly in the American presence. 
The other chief American concern in Eritrea, aside from 
its economic resources and the strategic value of its location at the 
mouth of the Red Sea, is the Kagnew radio station at Asmara. This 
>:<The Ralph Parsons Company in Los Angeles reports 
that it no longer has potash and mining operations in Ethiopia. (Ed.] 
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$60 million complex is the largest high-frequency station for the 
United States. It is valued because it is more than one mile high 
and not far from the equator--factors of importance for radio 
transmission. Messages from the U.S. military, State Department, 
and overseas Embassies are relayed by Kagnew. Its main function, 
however, is as electronic listening post of the Arab world and of 
many of the socialist countries. Specialists in code deciphering 
are kept very busy at Kagnew. In 1967 there were approximately 
3, 200 Americans and their dependents. In 1970, although official 
publications estimated the number of Americans to be about 3, 100, 
people who had been there felt it was closer to 4, 000. This is no 
ordinary military base, but a vital and important link in the American 
intelligence system. 
In July, 1965, two United States airmen, Cpl. Ronald Dolecki 
and Chief Warrant Officer Jack Kalbach, were captured by the ELF 
while the two servicemen were on what was designated as an ''aerial 
mapping survey. 11 Two weeks of searching by 10,000 Ethiopian troops 
failed to produce the men, who were subsequently released by the 
ELF. 
In March, 1967, a special U.S. State Department task force 
was set up to watch over the area's "problems. 11 Heavy fighting between 
the Eritrean Liberation Army and Ethiopian forces broke out between 
April 23 and May 7, 1969, with the Ethiopian Army hoping to crush the 
ELA. Stiff resistence was met and six American "advisors" were 
reported killed. Later in 1969 four Americans allegedly on a National 
Geographic study team were held by the ELF for sixteen days before 
being released. Other incidents between the ELF and American ser-
vicemen have purportedly occurred, but they are publicly dismissed 
by the Ethiopians as being the work of "bandits" (shifta). 
On February 13, 1970, the American Secretary of State, 
William P. Rogers, reported that the American Consul General, Murray 
Jackson, had been kidnapped by the ELF near Asmara. After this, 
security tightened considerably and Americans were told to travel only 
in two-car convoys and not to drive far from the Asmara area. By 
the end of 1970, the Emperor declared a State of Emergency to employ 
martial law in the province. 
In January 1971 the ELF struck at Americans again and 
ambushed a G. I. from Brooklyn, who was reportedly "delivering U.S. 
Army mail. 11 General Westmoreland visited there in February 1971 
and inspected Army installations and the communications base at 
Asmara. 
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More M-16 rifles were requested by the Ethiopians, and 
this request has been relayed to the United States Congress. In 
March, 1971, Brigadier General Robert Meyer, Commander of the 
U.S. Strategic Communications Command, also visited Kagnew in 
view of increasing the security of the base. These cases can only 
point to one thing: American involvement is increasing as the ELF 
grows stronger and bolder and as the Ethiopian Imperial Government 
is less able to defend itself without outside aid from the United States. 
The First National Congress of the Eritrean Liberation 
Front took place after ten years of armed struggle. It was attended 
by about 300 people. During this Conference, the first to be held in 
liberated Eritrea, new directions were set. A split in 1969 purified 
the movement by exposing the bourgeois nationalist elements from 
the revolutionary socialists.':' The top three positions--political 
bureau, military affairs, and foreign affairs--are now in the hands 
of revolutionaries. True democratic power is in the hands of the 
people as representatives from the village committees (some walked 
a month to get to the Congress), women's groups, the soldiers, and 
other elements all gathered to discuss the coming years of struggle, 
the strategy, the goals, and the general program. Each day political 
discussion took almost as much time as marching. There was constant 
and enthusiastic dialogue, and the works of Mao, Lenin, and Marx are 
all dog-eared and worn, having passed through innumerable hands. 
However, although much of the ideology is Maoist, the armaments are 
Eastern European. 
An independent Eritrea under the ELF would resemble 
the situation in Cuba in that it would be a politically radical state on 
one hand and geographically isolated on the other. American political 
and economic interests would also be similar, as well as the relatively 
strategic importance of Eritrea's physical location. With the Eritrean 
struggle against neo-colonialism and American imperialism moving 
steadily ahead, there are realistic hopes for the creation of an island 
in Africa of socialist democracy and freedom. 
':'This is not to say that certain splits do not still exist, but 
only that the "Popular Front" has suffered considerable isolation as a 
result of the important Congress. 
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l A Black Mauritian Poet Speaks 
Edouard Maunick 
A highly praised poet from the island of Mauritius tells 
of his ancestry, how he was affected by the various racial 
feelings of his family and community, and the eventual 
influence upon him of Malagasy, West Indian, and African 
poets. He speaks eloquently of Negritude and how people 
from the islands must stop facing inward to the land but 
rather turn outward to the ocean and a wider world. 
2 South Africa: Three Visitors Report 
Dr. George Kennan, Prof. Leon Gordenker, Dr. Wilton Dillon 
An historian, a political scientist, and an anthropologist 
survey the South African racial and political scene and come 
up with differing criticism and potential American policies 
based on their own personal interviews and observations. 
3 Choiseul Papers. Unpublished ms 1761 
These secret reports from Dakar concerning the French and 
British maneuverings on the West coast of Africa are filled 
with fact and intrigue involving the slave trade. The 
original manuscripts in French, reproduced in facsimile, 
are accompanied by an English translation. An introduction 
discusses the historical context of the papers and their 
origin, and the French Foreign Minister and his policies. 
4 How Black South African Visitors View the U.S. 
A resume with ample quotations of how some sixty Africans 
from the Republic have reacted to educational, political, 
moral and other values they have encountered while visiting 
the United States. Previous statistical studies are 
summarized in four appendixes. 
5 Current Politics in Ghana 
Dr. John Fynn, M.P. 
Political and economic priorities of the Busia government 
are outlined by Dr. Fynn, followed by a question and answer 
segment in which he throws fresh light on the Nkrumah era 
and the current activities of key figures who were in the 
Nkrumah regime. An informed observer in Ghana comments on 
Dr. Fynn's views. 
$1.00 
$2.00 
$4.00 
$1.00 
$1.00 
6 Walking 300 Miles with Guerillas Through 
~t~h~e~B~u~s~h~o~f~E~a~s~t~e~r~n~A~n~g~o~l~a~·-----------------------------------------$2.00 
Basil Davidson 
The famous British historian and journalist describes in 
detail his adventurous trek from Zambia to 100 miles inside 
the Angola border in order to assess the relative strength of 
the MPLA vs the Portuguese and vs other nationalist groups, 
the sources and extent of the MPLA arms, new Portuguese 
helicopter tactics, and the response of the guerillas. A 
sketch map of the military situation is included. 

